Hello Professor Chalmers,

Pardon me.

I want to know if you find the following epistemic model sound. I am a Mathematics student at the University of Chicago. While I am not well studied in philosophy (though I do know who you are), I can’t stop myself from thinking about Physicalism, which I have thought about a great deal and will only touch on a small bit in this email. Please put me to rest and explain why I should give up thinking about this altogether, so I may move on with my life.

Consider a question. And suppose we choose to respond to it. It may be viewed as

-An epistemic question, in the sense that it is truth-seeking

-A non-epistemic question, in the sense that it is not truth-seeking (usually, rather, in order to manipulate people, communicate, associate, etc.)

-Perhaps several implicit questions at once of various types

-A particular type may be intended by the asker, but he may not even realize this intention himself. If one responds at all, however, one must choose an interpretation to produce an answer to.

In the case it is an epistemic question, it has an answer precisely to the extent that it is reducible to a question about the state of the physical world, which has dimensions mass/energy, space, and time, and is approximated by human senses, language, and cognition. That is to say that because we are not omniscient, we may postulate about the state of the physical world with only so much precision, rendering any question only reducible to some extent to a question about the state of the physical world. And the answer to the epistemic question, which is an epistemic statement, is a fact about the state of the physical world. In the case it is not an epistemic question, it has no answer in an epistemic sense. One is advised to respond to these questions, but only viewing the presentation of the question as a “speech action” of which you are the object. This is to say that a question has an answer insofar as and only insofar as it is reducible to a question about the state of the physical world. The remaining questions--while you may still be obliged to answer them--serve other purposes.

Let us consider the question you might be familiar with: “Does consciousness exist?”

In any sense that it is an epistemic question, we attempt to reduce it to a question about the state of the physical world. In that sense, perhaps we may respond that, as best as we can approximate, there is a particular region of the brain appearing to concentrate abstract cognition, and whose activity appears to be associated with testimonies of “conscious sensation.” In any sense of consciousness as “qualia,” we again ask how this may be reduced to a question about the state of the physical world. And it is, I think, quite inherently not reducible that way. Therefore, beyond that, it is not an epistemic question. In a non-epistemic sense, it is possible that someone is trying to start a fun debate with you, or show their intellectual prowess to their peers, or even make a living as a philosophy professor, or perhaps resolve some emotional turmoil about their own mind and inconsequential importance, and so on. And these are interesting nonetheless, but not epistemic in nature.

Another question you may be asked on occasion is “What is your favorite color?” It may be a bit confusing whether this is an epistemic or non-epistemic question, for one because it could be both. Realistically, the intention is probably a non-epistemic question masquerading as an epistemic one, and, if you are autistic, you might not realize this. We will humor any epistemic intent first, however. The epistemic interpretation is already a bit ambiguous, because it might not be clear how a “favorite color” can be reduced to a state of the physical world. In a response, however, we are tasked with determining the best interpretation of the intention of the question however we can. This epistemic interpretation, most commonly I believe, yields a reduction (approximately, and in terms of how I imagine it is intended) to something like determining the small span of wavelengths of light that has on average delivered the most dopamine at first sight within an hour period over one’s adult life. You may estimate an answer to this to the best of your abilities, however, that is probably a daunting task. Thankfully, most of the time I believe the question is primarily of non-epistemic intent. That is, they are just trying to make conversation, or they just want to know which colors to associate with you or which you will approve of. For these purposes, perhaps one may simply respond with the least offensive color to them they can think of, or if that would make one seem strange, perhaps choose a nice-sounding one at random. One is not lying very much, because the question is almost wholly not an epistemic one.

Let us classify a number of common intentions of questions

Epistemic	Non-epistemic
Where are my keys? Does this contain caffeine? What color is this? How many cats are there? Where did the train go? When did that happen? What did they calculate inflation at?	Does free will exist? Does consciousness exist? Does God exist? Can humans ever know anything? Am I a good person? Is the death penalty immoral? What is a woman? What is love? Does subjective experience exist? Which political party is the best? Which values of X solve X^2=2 over R?

This framework seems to me a razor which classifies the majority of discourse of all kinds as epistemically aimless and clarifies which discourse is epistemically oriented at all, to what extent, and in what way. There is non-epistemic discourse, but I find it to be very helpful to be able to recognize the difference. I am aware of many nuances to this discussion, and I would be happy to elaborate them, but I am presenting it not as a bible of epistemology, but rather as an outline of sorts of a practical epistemic framework which may be detailed if necessary.

I would like to know if you think I am wasting my time.

Best,

-George

this view was popular among the logical positivists/empiricists in the 1930s.  a.j. ayer's "language truth and logic" is a good introduction.  the expression "noncognitive" is sometimes used for your "nonepistemic" class.  i wouldn't privilege the physical world as you do in this framework, though.

Hi Professor Chalmers,

I appreciate taking the time to respond much more than you might imagine! I believe I could convince you otherwise, however. If you are interested in reading but only one more line, I would simply ask, hypothetically, if anything at all:

What could be provided that would convince you otherwise? Say, perhaps a proof, a scientific study, a letter from Daniel Dennet etc.

If you are interested in reading a few more lines, I will say

1. The framework I presented doesn’t make either fatal mistake of the positivists/ayer that a. Language has objective truth values b. Language can be “meaningless.” Instead, it is a framework of responding to questions within language and context, and informs which questions given an intention have answers at all, how much, and in what way. “All swans are white,” for example, isn’t meaningless because to the extent you are obligated to respond at all, it has intention in its presentation. It may always have non-epistemic meaning. It has an answer insofar as it's reducible to a question about the state of the physical world. That is, we may interpret intentions such that they have feasibly approximated answers (you have seen only white living swans in your adult lifetime), or infeasibly approximated answers (all swans in the universe living right now are white). And those intentions are not per say definable by language (though one can approximate them linguistically) but rather approximations of an intention, or even perhaps completely fabricated. Perhaps I need to explain more, but I do not believe it has been refuted before. I would be happy to detail it fully (I am trying to be concise in emails) on a few examples if you are that skeptical.

2. I just read through your paper Consciousness and the Collapse of the Wave Function and I think it very much needs this framework. The section devoted to the causal role of consciousness reveals essentially that productive work makes sense only within physicalism. You’ve written a paper within physicalism and simply drawn an equals sign between consciousness and something physical. Not only is this a vindication of physicalism, but it is also flawed, because as this epistemic framework suggests, one cannot draw equal signs from “consciousness” to something physical. One may only attempt to reduce questions involving the word to questions of physical phenomena. Certainly any understanding of any intention of the use of the term “consciousness” by humans cannot perfectly approximate a state of the physical world simply because humans cannot perfectly conceive of a state of the physical world, and language is simply a means of facilitating conception and human interaction. If we are truly concerned with a particular facet of what is meant by “consciousness” that is beyond a particular type of computation (which you seem very motivated by, and which I agree we should be motivated by), we should instead be explicating how these questions are reducible to states of the physical world, not quite explicitly how they are not. I could genuinely go on about this for hours but will try not to look so exhausting.

Best,

-George

1, positivists believed in noncognitive meaning. 2. wrong paper -- try "consciousness and its place in nature".

Hi Professor Chalmers,

First, I want to say that it is an excellent paper and a pleasure to read. The above framework is indeed one of type A materialism in any practical sense of epistemology.

Despite the comprehensive argument summaries, let’s be honest and say that your main objection appears to be that denying the existence of consciousness is “denying the manifest.” I gather this, because, while I will respond to this objection, barring dismissal, one may very cleanly resolve all of the pro-dualist arguments by nullifying epistemic gaps in principle. Thus, while most difficult to explain, this objection is the point at which the entire rejection of materialism rests. If you do not believe that consequence would be so clean, I believe I could explain it simply.

I respond to this objection by saying that in terms of what is “manifest,” no right mind denies that humans experience and possess subjective interpretations of the world. I certainly do not. There is a difference between the fact that you experience and the supposed reality of what you experience, including any purported fundamentally “subjective” nature of that experience or whatever jumble or words one would summon to describe qualia. Consider the sensation of the heat from a fire. There is of course the heat physically, and separately there is our reaction to it within our bodies and minds. The same must be said of consciousness in any description. It exists to some extent, but any internal construction of it does not. I don't understand how that distinction is uncharitable to our own subjectivity. It seems like hubris to expect it to be anything other than a tool to approximate the world and direct your human agent.

The standard for your remaining objections seems to be that consciousness as a phenomenon in and of itself requires a physical explanation under physicalism. This is a misguided and asymmetric requirement, as it suffices to speak about a physical explanation of fire without a physical explanation of fire as a pure phenomenon. Physical processes explain the source of the phenomenon of fire, including the ways it comes to influence our senses, but not the phenomenon in and of itself. The same must be said of the phenomenon of consciousness. Indeed, any meta-awareness of our internal workings are phenomena of phenomenon and may be subject to the same reductions. Physical processes may explain the source of this impression but expecting them to explain it as a phenomenon in and of itself is unprecedented. This requirement seems like a misunderstanding of what materialism posits in the first place, frankly.

Constructively speaking, I think there are many benefits to using the above framework. Indeed, it eliminates “hard problems,” though I almost get the sense you want there to be one. I think these benefits are across discourse, life, science, policy, ethics, etc. and I would be happy to elaborate them.

Best,

-George